What Determines the Attractiveness of EU Regions to the Location of Multinational Firms in the ICT Sector? by Siedschlag, Iulia et al.
    DYNREG   
  Dynamic Regions in a Knowledge- 
          Driven Global Economy 





















                                                              
What Determines the Attractiveness of 
EU Regions to the Location of 
Multinational Firms in the ICT Sector?  





































45  / 2009        
WORKING PAPERS What Determines the Attractiveness of  EU Regions   
 
to the Location of Multinationals in the ICT Sector? 
 
Iulia Siedschlag, Xiaoheng Zhang, Donal Smith 
 
The Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin  
 






We examine the attractiveness of European Union regions for location of multinationals in the 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) sector. Using data on 8,543 foreign 
subsidiaries established in 229 regions of the European Union over the period 1998-2008 we find 
that on average, the location probability increases with regional demand, agglomeration 
economies, technological development, flexibility of labour markets, and information technology 
infrastructure. The determinants of the location choice of ICT multinationals are different for 
regions in Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. While in Western Europe, regions 
with higher GDP per capita are preferred for both ICT multinationals in manufacturing and 
service sectors, in Central and Eastern Europe, regions with lower GDP per capita attract the bulk 
of ICT multinationals in the service sector. Unemployment rates appear negatively correlated 
with the probability of location in the whole European Union and Western Europe, while they 
increase attractiveness for regions in Central and Eastern Europe. Some determinants are also 
found to have heterogeneous effects on multinationals from different countries. In particular, US 
multinationals are not sensitive to labour costs while EU multinationals respond to this factor 
negatively.   
 
JEL classification:  F23; O33; R38. 
Key words:   Foreign direct investment; Information and Communication Technologies;  
Location choice; Conditional logit; Nested logit; European Union.  
 
Corresponding author:   iulia.siedschlag@esri.ie 
   1
1   Introduction 
 
 Since the mid -1990s, dynamic growth has been associated with specialisation in ICT-producing 
and ICT-using industries (van Ark and Inkaar, 2005; Barrios and Navajas Cawood, 2008). 
Furthermore, it has been shown that ICT-producing sectors tend to promote technological change 
and innovation (Becchetti et al., 2003; Carlsson, 2004; Hollenstein, 2004). 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are at the core of the knowledge-driven 
economy and there is growing evidence to suggest that ICT-linked knowledge, innovation and 
technological changes are strong determinants of growth differentials and the ability of countries 
to benefit from globalization. While earlier studies have found little evidence of a link between 
ICT and output growth, more recent studies point to a positive effect of ICT investment on output 
growth (Oliner and Sichel 2000; Daveri 2001; Roeger 2001; van Ark 2001; Pilat and Lee 2001; 
OECD 2001). 
The renewed Lisbon Strategy agreed in March 2005 put a special emphasis on the role ICT can 
play in boosting growth, competitiveness and cohesion in the European Union (EU). In relation 
to this, on the 1
st of June 2005 the European Commission has launched a five-year 
comprehensive strategy - “i2010”- to foster growth and jobs in the ICT sector
1. This initiative 
contains a package of proactive policies to promote an open and competitive digital economy. A 
large amount of EU expenditure over the period 2007-2013 has been allocated to ICT investment. 
In particular, the European Commission has earmarked € 1,8 billion annually for research 
priorities in the area of Information Society and Technology as part of the 7
th Framework 
Programme (FP7) and a further € 825 million on a specific programme focused on ICT policy 
support, which is a new programme within the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme 
(CIP).   
Furthermore, there has been an increasing internationalisation of ICT activity which raises a 
number of questions which are of interest and relevance both for research and policy making: 
Where are the ICT multinational enterprises located in the European Union? Who are the main 
foreign investors in the ICT activity in the European Union? What factors drive the location 
choice of multinational ICT activity?  
                                                 
1 “i2010-A European Information Society for Growth and Employment”, Commission of the European Communities, 
COM(2005) 229,http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/key_documents/   2
The analysis of the location choice of foreign investment has focused on multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). It assumes that factors driving location decisions do not vary across sectors. Many 
studies have focused on one country and analyzed the location choice of MNEs within that 
country.  
This paper analyses the determinants of the location of multinational enterprises in the ICT sector 
across European Union regions. Our sample includes 8,543 foreign affiliates of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) in the ICT sector located in 229 regions in the European Union over the 
period 1998-2008. The firm-level data source is the Amadeus database.  
The novelties of this paper are threefold. First, we provide fresh empirical evidence on the 
determinants of the location choice of multinationals in the ICT manufacturing and services 
across EU regions. Second, we use an improved econometric methodology to account for spatial 
dependence in the location choice. Third, we account for the heterogeneity of foreign investors 
by allowing the probability of investing in a specific region to be different depending on the 
country of origin of foreign investors.   
Our results suggest that on average, the probability of locating in an EU region (NUTS 2) 
increases with the size of demand (market potential), agglomeration economies (positive 
spillover effects from existing firms in the ICT sector), technological development (R&D 
expenditure), flexibility of labour markets, and information technology infrastructure. The 
determinants of the location choice of ICT multinationals are different for regions in Western 
Europe (EU15) compared to those in Central and Eastern Europe (EU10). While in Western 
Europe, regions with higher GDP per capita are the preferred locations for ICT multinationals in 
both the manufacturing and service sectors, in Central and Eastern Europe, regions with lower 
GDP per capita attract the bulk of ICT service multinationals. A negative competition effect from 
domestic ICT firms is found in Western Europe for the service sectors. Unemployment rates 
appear negatively correlated with the probability of location in the whole EU and Western 
Europe, while they increase attractiveness for regions in Central and Eastern Europe. Some 
determinants are also found to have heterogeneous effects on multinationals from different 
countries. In particular, US multinationals are not sensitive to labour costs while EU 
multinationals respond to this factor negatively.     3
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical and empirical 
foundations on the location choice of multinational enterprises. Section 3 presents the empirical 
methodology and model specifications. Section 4 describes the data and summary statistics of the 
main variables. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
2   Theoretical and Empirical Background  
Industrial location is a consequence of the interaction between various economic agents and 
economic forces. Two strands of literature shed light on this issue with different focuses on 
particular economic agents and forces. The first and earlier strand is the literature on 
multinational enterprises’ activities, which originates from Caves (1971) and Dunning (1971). 
MNEs shift production across countries through the channel of FDI, which can be either 
“vertical” or “horizontal” in nature. Through horizontal FDI MNEs gain access to foreign 
markets without incurring trade costs between countries
2. Via vertical FDI, MNEs can avail of 
lower factor prices in host countries. 
3 More recently, an export-platform motivated FDI was 
formalised in Ekholm et al. (2007) and the model is highly relevant to MNEs’ FDI into a free-
trade area, such as the European Union. This strand of literature highlights the motivations for 
MNE’s FDI and its importance as it contributes to the global or regional production location. 
The second strand of literature, the New Economic Geography (NEG) focuses on the geographic 
distribution of overall economic activities. 
4 According to this literature, the exact location pattern 
is decided by the interaction of trade costs between regions and the pecuniary externalities 
generated inside the IRS industry. Since the pecuniary externalities play a central role in the 
distribution of economic activities, the literature is in sharp contrast to the Marshall-type theory 
which sees the distribution as a consequence of technological externalities between firms and also 
the Neo-classic trade theory that addresses the determinant roles of technological differences and 
factor endowments. Some important NEG models
5   show that agglomeration benefits are 
generated in the IRS industry if firms cluster in one region through various mechanisms.
6 On the 
                                                 
2 See Brainard (1993) and Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) for theoretical explanations. 
3 See Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) for example. 
4 The increasing-return-to-scale (IRS) industry is a central subject of the NEG theory. 
5 Krugman (1991), Venerables (1996), Baldwin (1999) and Puga (1999) for example. 
6 For instance, Krugman (1991) demonstrates that higher market demand (“backward” linkage) and lower nominal 
wage rates (“forward” linkage) in an agglomerated region create centripetal force to self-reinforce the agglomeration 
trend. Other mechanisms include the upstream-down stream linkages (in Venerable, 1996) and endogenous capital 
accumulation (in Baldwin, 1999).   4
other hand, dispersion forces also exist, such as competition in local product market, which 
lowers price and competition in labour market that raises labour costs. 
Hence, we see the first literature suggesting that MNEs are an important element in industrial 
location and both literatures establish the roles of market access, factor prices and industrial 
agglomeration in attracting firms into different regions. 
The location choice of MNEs, subject to the aforementioned economic factors has been put into 
examination empirically in many studies using a discrete-choice framework. Of particular 
relevance to our work are studies that focus on the location choice of MNEs across several 
European countries, at region
7 and country level: for example, Devereux and Griffith (1998) for 
US MNEs in 3 European countries; Basile et al. (2003) on EU and US MNEs’ investments in 55 
NUTS 1 regions in 8 EU countries; Head and Mayer (2004) for Japanese firms in 9 EU countries 
at the NUTS 1 level; Disdier and Mayer (2004) for French MNEs in Western Europe and Eastern 
Europe; Crozet et al. (2004) for foreign investments in French regions; Defever (2006) for 
MNEs’ investment projects in 23 European countries; Pusterla and Resmini (2005) for high-tech 
and low-tech investments in four Central and Eastern European countries; Mataloni (2007) for 
US MNEs in the EU; Mayer et al. (2007) for French-owned investments made home and abroad 
and finally Barrios and Cawood (2008) for the ICT producing sectors in the EU25. 
The importance of local goods markets on the probability of one region or country being chosen 
by MNE investors is confirmed in most research. The evidence on the roles of labour costs is 
mixed.  For example, wage rates are generally found to be negatively associated with the location 
choice of new establishments, but the effect may also be positive or insignificant (Devereux and 
Griffith, 1998; Barrios et al., 2003, Pusterla and Resmini, 2005 and Mataloni, 2007).  Several 
arguments are proposed to explain the positive effect of wage rates. For instance, wage rates 
work as a signal on the quality of labour, and consequently foreign MNEs would accept high 
wages in order to secure skilled labour.
8  The positive wage effect on FDI may also reflect an 
“industry bias” or “skill bias” in the data. Békés (2005) suggests that MNEs are most likely to be 
                                                 
7 Regional level studies are normally conducted at different NUTS level.  NUTS stands for Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics, the official regional classification system developed by EUROSTAT to facilitate 
regional study in the European Union.  Current version of the NUTS classifies 25 member states at the NUTS 0 
(country level), and then further decomposes these countries into 89 regions at the NUTS1 level, 255 regions at the 
NUTS2 level and 1,221 regions at the NUTS3 level. 
8 Moreover, Guimaraes et al. (2002) argue that wage effects may be significant between countries but not necessarily 
important across regions within one country if investors have already decided on the country in which to invest.   5
in the high-tech sectors where the wage is high or, they are bringing superior technologies to host 
countries and consequently are hiring more skilled or managerial workers than domestic firms. 
Agglomeration forces are seen as playing an important role in many studies. For example, Bartik 
(1985), Head et al. (1995) and Mataloni (2007) find that the existence of regional manufacturing 
activities encourages new manufacturing investments. In addition to that, foreign MNEs are more 
likely to set up their new plants in the locations where business already exist from the same 
country or even the same business group.
9  However, the results are not uniform for regions 
within countries
10 and across countries of the EU.
11 
A major methodological difference divides the aforementioned studies into two types: the ones 
assuming that all alternative locations are perfectly independent of each other, and the ones that 
assume certain level of correlation between alternatives. Obviously the second type is more 
capable of capturing the substitution pattern of alternatives in the real world. Most of the recent 
studies cited here are of the second type. 
12  They choose to group alternative locations into 
several nests according to the similarity of the alternatives
13 , thus the correlation is 
accommodated inside the nests. 
Following those empirical studies, we use discrete-choice models on the ICT sectors and apply 
nesting structures on alternative regions. 
                                                 
9 For example, Japanese firms tend to locate in the regions with other firms from the same industrial group, or 
Keiretsu. 
10 For example, Hogenbirk and Narula (2004) find that when comparing the Randstad region (the agglomerated 
region containing large cities, major ports and airports) with the rest of the Netherlands, the presence of local 
business seems to work as a deterrent for new foreign establishments. 
11 Disdier and Mayer (2004), using data on French MNEs, find that industrial agglomeration is less important as a 
factor influencing their location-choice decisions in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. 
12 With an exception of Barrios and Cawood (2008). 
13 Defever (2006) does not apply any nesting structure on alternative locations, but rather assuming that the effects of 
alternative-specific variables vary across individuals. This is a more flexible way to tackle the correlation between 
alternatives.    6
3   Empirical  Methodology 
We employ two discrete-choice models to study the location choice of MNEs. The first one is the 
conditional logit model (CLM), as proposed in McFadden (1974). Given the simple structure of 
the probability function of the CLM, it has been widely used to study the problems of consumer’s 
choice, travel mode choice and location choice of FDI. 
Suppose there are J  alternatives available to individual i and the individual needs to make a 
single choice amongst all alternatives in order to maximise his utility ij U . The utility of choosing 
alternative  j   can be expressed as a function of all observable characteristics of the 
alternative, ij X′ , with an unobservable part of utility. Therefore, we can write 
(1)   ij ij ij UX β ε ′ =+ . 
ij ε  is the unobservable utility or simply the error term of the utility function. McFadden shows 
that, if (and only if)  , (1,..., ) ij j J ε ∀=  follows a type I extreme value distribution IID across all 
















The simple IID assumption over the error term gives the CLM a unique property called 
“Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)”. Simply put, the choice made between any 
pair of two alternatives amongst J  alternatives is independent of the rest of the alternatives. 
However, it is often found that IIA cannot hold in many discrete-choice cases. For instance, if the 
error term contains an unobservable individual preference towards some alternatives, which share 
common characteristics that are again unobservable to researchers, the error terms of these 
alternatives will correlate with each other and thus IIA is violated. 
14 
In order to account for the correlation among utilities generated from alternatives, a nesting 
structure can be imposed on the alternatives. The structure assumes that alternatives can be 
grouped into several nests according to similarity of those alternatives, therefore correlation of 
utilities is allowed within a nest, but not between nests. The nesting structure leads to a group of 
                                                 
14 Train (2003) terms such kind of error term structure as “error components”.   7
flexible models called nested logit models (NLM), where the error term follows one of 
generalised extreme value (GEV) distributions (see Ben-Akiva, 1973, Train, 1986, Train et al, 
1987 and Forinash and Koppelman, 1993). 
Following Heiss (2002), let the error term in Eq. (1) follow a generalised extreme value 
distribution. Denote 1 kk τ ρ = − , where  k ρ  is the correlation of alternatives in nest k , thus  k τ  
measures the independence of alternatives in nest k . If  1 k τ = , the alternatives are perfectly 
independent of each other, and if  0 k τ = , perfect dependence exists. One can further write the log 
sum of utilities generated from alternatives in nest k  as  






= ∑  
IV  is the inclusive value of nest k  (denoted by  k n ). Therefore,  k τ  is also called the IV parameter 
of  k n . The probability function of alternative h  in nest k  being chosen is the product of the 
probability of choosing nest k  [Pr( ) k ] and the conditional probability of choosing h given k  is 
chosen [Pr( | ) hk]. The function can be expressed as follows 
(4)  
exp( / ) exp( )
Pr( |1,..., ) Pr( | )Pr( )











where  h τ  and  h IV  are the IV parameter and the inclusive value for the nest containing alternative 
h. 
It can be shown that the probability ratio of any two alternatives from two different nests contains 
factors related to the utility of other alternatives in those two nests (through the presence of the 
inclusive value) but the probability ratio of any two alternatives within the same nest does not 
contain factors of other alternatives in that nest. 
15 That is to say, IIA is allowed within nests, but 
not across nests. 
Finally, the choice of nesting structures is multiple. Sometimes natural nesting structures arise as 
in the location case: country-region based nests. Otherwise, regions or countries can be 
partitioned depending geographic and economic similarity of them. However, Greene (2002, 
pp727) points out that there is no systematic way to identify a best structure amongst all possible 
                                                 
15 See Train (2003), Chapter 4, pp 84.   8
nests. Fortunately, there exists a boundary for the NLM to be consistent with the Random Utility 
Maximisation (RUM) framework - the IV parameter  k τ  has to be bounded between 0 and 1 
(Heiss, 2002). In the case of  1 k τ = , alternatives in a nest are completely independent of each 
other, thus nesting becomes unnecessary and the NLM collapses into the CLM. On the other 
hand, if  0 k τ = , alternatives in a nest are perfect substitutes to each other and only the nest 
becomes a valid alternative. 
Model Specifications and Econometric Issues 
The dependent variable is the location choice of each MNE over 246 regions. Following other 
empirical studies of location choice, we use market potential to proxy the potential demand from 
a region and its adjacent regions. This measure is introduced in Harris (1954) in order to capture 
the spatial correlation between regions. We expect a positive effect from this variable on the 
probability of location. 
On the supply side, we use GDP per capita to proxy regional labour costs. The potential 
complication is that GDP per capita also reflects regional development, in terms of labour skills 
and technological development (the “signal” function). There may also exist “industry bias” or 
“skill bias” in the data. Due to these factors the percentage of manufacturing workers holding 
tertiary education degrees is used to control for labour skills and total R&D expenditure of 
business and government or ICT patent applications to control for technological development. 
The expected effects of these two variables are positive. One additional control variable for 
labour-market conditions is the unemployment rate, which can proxy the potential local labour 
pool or the institutional rigidity in labour market. Depending on which factor is prevailing, the 
overall effect of unemployment is hard to predict a priori.   
Industrial agglomeration is also an important determinant in the location choice of MNEs, as 
implied by theoretical models and identified in empirical studies. The first measure of industrial 
agglomeration is the number of foreign-owned firms in both the ICT manufacturing sectors and 
service sectors depending on which sectors we examine. Being close to other foreign-owned 
firms in the same sector allows MNEs to avail of the benefits from information sharing on the 
local business environment for foreign investment (Banerjee, 1992 and Head et al., 1995 and 
1999 discuss such information-sharing function), technology spillover amongst MNEs and inter-  9
firm linkage of intermediate input and output. The above-mentioned sources generate a positive 
effect on MNEs’ location choice. On the other hand, a substantial presence of foreign investment 
in a region may also lead to serious competition in the local markets. Local labour, land and 
infrastructure can be bid up and thus reduce MNEs’ propensity to invest in such region (as argued 
in Crozet et al., 2004). Therefore, we do not hold an a priori belief on the overall effect of this 
industrial agglomeration measure. 
We also introduce the number of domestic-owned firms to proxy local business presence. By the 
same logic, the effect of this variable is ambiguous. However, we suggest that the negative 
competition effect of local business, if it exists, would be stronger in the service sectors than in 
the manufacturing sectors because the computer-related services, post and telecommunication 
services are non-tradable, in addition, the service sectors are more labour intensive than the 
manufacturing sectors. Therefore, the competition for local demand and local labour would be 
more intense for the former sectors. The number of total firms (both domestic and foreign owned) 
is also used in order to test the robustness of agglomeration effects. All three measures of 
agglomeration variables are spatially lagged in the same way as market potential. We deem these 
spatially-lagged agglomeration variables as an improvement on previous studies on location 
choice, usually they do not take into account spatial correlation of agglomeration between regions 
or countries (except Crozet et al., 2004 and Basile et al., 2008, 2009).  
The last regional variable is internet subscribers per 100 inhabitants. This variable is used to 
model the location choice of ICT service sectors because it can be seen as a valid indicator of 
information technology infrastructure, which is crucial for the ICT services (Barrios and Cawood, 
2008). 
At country level, we proxy policy effects with the statutory corporate tax rate which was often 
found to be important in MNEs’ location choice decisions across countries (Devereux and 
Griffith, 1998, Head and Mayer, 2004 and Mataloni, 2007 for example). 
All explanatory variables are lagged to account for the fact that implementation of investment 
decisions are in practice lagged. Specifically, explanatory variables are averages over the period 
1995 to 2002. Also, lagging the variables alleviates the issue of simultaneity in estimation. All 
explanatory variables, other than the ones in percentage form are transformed into logarithms. 
Therefore, their coefficients can be interpreted as average probability elasticity (APE). The APEs   10
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multiplying the coefficient of the NLM by the parameter 
11







− +− ∑ .  L  is the 
number of regions in the choice set. Since there are up to 246 regions in the choice set, the first 
parameter is close to unity. 
16 K  is the number of nests at upper level of the choice set and 
k n J  is 
the number of regions in nest k . For the derivation of the APE for the NLM see Appendix 1. For 
the variables expressed in percentages, their APEs are evaluated at the mean values of those 
variables. 
We present two full models for the ICT manufacturing sectors and the service sectors 
respectively. In Eq. (5), R&D expenditure is replaced by the number of ICT patent applications, 
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Definitions and sources of country and region-level explanatory variables are given in  
Table A1 in Appendix 2. Tables A2a and A2b show the descriptive statistics of the region and 
country-level variables respectively. 
                                                 
16 See Head et al. (1995) and Head and Mayer (2004) for the derivation of average probability elasticity.   11
4 Firm-level  Data 
Our data set contains 8,944 foreign affiliates of multinational enterprises in the ICT sectors 
located in 246 regions in the European Union and established in the period from 1998 to 2008 
(inclusive). The data is obtained from the Amadeus database, which is by far the most 
comprehensive database of European firm accounts
17. The choice of foreign affiliates is based on 
the fact that MNEs are able to make their location choice in multiple countries or regions. This 
makes it possible to study country and region-level characteristics that affect the attractiveness of 
countries and regions. A foreign affiliate is defined as a firm having one foreign shareholder with 
at least 10 per cent of voting share. This definition is in line with IMF and OECD’s definitions of 
“foreign direct investment enterprise” (IMF, 1993). The ICT sectors include, according to NACE 
industrial classification, five sectors at 2-digit level as follows:  
30   Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
32   Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
33   Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments 
64   Post and telecommunications 
72   Computer and related activities 
Each of the qualified firms is regarded as a location choice made by MNEs during the period 
from 1998 to 2008. This period allows us to include both the EU15 countries and the new EU 
countries in MNEs’ location-choice set. 
18 We choose to examine the location choice at region 
level rather than country level because MNEs do not only look at the characteristics of countries 
when making their location choices. Rich information about regional characteristics is also 
                                                 
17 Amadeus is a firm-level database published by electronic publisher Bureau van Dijk. It contains data for over 11 
million firms located in 45 European countries. The data cover basic profile, the balance sheet, profit and loss 
account, financial ratios and ownership structure of a firm.     
18 The EU15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. New EU countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvian, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. We do not include Cyprus 
and Malta in this study because Amadeus shows there is no ICT firm established during the period in Cyprus and 
nine ICT firms located in Malta are not foreign-owned.   12
available. Specifically, we observe each location choice in one of 246 NUTS 2 regions in 25 EU 
countries. 
19 
The ICT sectors contain three manufacturing sectors
20 (30, 32 and 33) and two service sectors (64 
and 72). We study the manufacturing and service sectors separately because the location choice 
of MNEs in these two groups may be affected by different country-level and region-level 
characteristics, or the same characteristic may affect the MNEs differently. For instance, we can 
expect that manufacturing MNEs are more likely to be attracted by industrial agglomeration and 
R&D expenditures while the service MNEs may prefer good infrastructure of information 
technologies. Market potential may be more important for the service MNEs but less relevant for 
the manufacturing MNEs, given that their products are tradable. 
The ICT manufacturing sectors include 1,342 foreign affiliates. The geographic distribution of 
these firms across countries is detailed in Table A3. The distribution is highly uneven. For all 
three 2-digit sectors, Germany received the largest number of new firms of all EU25 countries, 
while among the EU10 countries, Romania received the largest number of new firms. If the firms 
are broken down by ownership, looking at all three sectors, the UK received the largest number 
of MNEs from the US, and Germany received the largest number of MNEs from the EU and 
other countries (except for NACE 30). Furthermore, it is worth noting, that foreign ownership is 
consistent across the three sectors. For instance, the firms owned by US MNEs account for about 
24 to 29 per cent of all firms in each sector. That share varies from 47 to 53 per cent for EU 
MNEs and 23 to 27 per cent for other MNEs. 
Table A4 presents the shares of new firms in each country across sectors. The cumulative shares 
for the EU15 and EU10 countries reveal that the new firms created in the EU10 account for 16 
(NACE 33) to 24 per cent (NACE 30) of all firms created in the EU25. 
In comparison to the manufacturing sector, the ICT service sectors contain a larger number of 
foreign affiliates  - 7,602. Table A5 reports the geographic distribution of the ICT service MNEs 
across the EU25 countries. Among them, the UK received the largest number of firms in both 
NACE 64 and 72 sectors in terms of total firms or by ownership, while Romania received the 
                                                 
19 Total 269 NUTS 2 regions are defined for the 25 EU countries while we only observe the firms located in 246 
NUTS 2 regions. 
20 The manufacturing sectors are ICT producing sectors; we focus on these sectors because they are likely to foster 
technological change and innovation.    13
largest number of firms among the EU10 countries. Again we can see that foreign ownership is 
consistent for the two service sectors. 
Table A6 reports the shares of firms in each country. The sums of shares for the EU15 and EU10 
countries reveal that the new firms created in the EU10 accounted for 13.4 (NACE 72) to 18.9 
per cent (NACE 64) of all firms created in EU25. 
The highly-skewed geographic distribution of the ICT industries at country level is also 
documented in Barrios and Cawood (2008). The difference is that they use employment as the 
subject and do not include Bulgaria or Romania.   
5   Empirical  Results 
We begin with the estimates of conditional logit models CLM which we use as benchmark.  
The Location of ICT Producing Manufacturing: Conditional Logit Models  
Table 1 reports the results for determinants of the location choice of MNEs in ICT manufacturing 
sectors. Model 1 is a baseline model with only market potential, GDP per capita and 
agglomeration variables. GDP per capita has a significantly negative coefficient. The spatially-
lagged numbers of foreign firms and domestic firms have significantly positive coefficients. 
These results suggest that new investments of MNEs are attracted by the presence of both 
foreign-owned and domestic firms but discouraged by labour costs. However, the coefficient of 
market potential is not significant. In Models 2 and 3, two more variables controlling for labour 
market conditions enter the baseline model, namely, education attainment of the labour force and 
the unemployment rate. Looking at the two new variables first, we see that educational 
attainment affects the probability of a region being chosen positively, second the negative effect 
of the unemployment rate indicates that institutional rigidity in labour market reduces the 
attractiveness of a region to MNEs. These findings are in line with the high-tech feature of the 
ICT sectors - MNEs in these sectors deem the skill level as an important factor, rather than the 
access to the labour pool. 
21 After controlling for the skill and institutional features of the labour 
market, GDP per capita shows an even stronger negative effect in Model 2 and 3, while market 
potential becomes positive and significant.   
                                                 
21 Statistic evidence reported in Barrios and Cawood (2004) supports our argument. They report that the share of 
employees with university degree is ranging from 32.2 per cent to 50.2 per cent for the ICT manufacturing sectors in 
the EU25, while the share for non-ICT sectors is 25.2 per cent.   14
In Models 4 and 5, we include two measures of R&D level along with the statutory tax rate. The 
two R&D variables enter the model separately because they are highly correlated. Both measures, 
total R&D expenditure and the number of patent applications from ICT sectors had positive 
effects on the attractiveness of regions. The coefficients are all significant at the 1 per cent level 
and are of the same magnitude. This is strong evidence suggesting that local technology 
development is a crucial determinant of MNEs’ location choice. Since a certain level of benefits 
of technology level comes from inter-firm spillovers, we see that the positive effects of 
agglomeration of foreign and domestic firms are reduced. 
The statutory corporate tax rate shows significantly positive coefficients in Model 4 and 5. Such a 
tax effect is also found in Basile et al. (2008), who find that the corporate tax rate affects location 
choice positively. We argue that the finding is reasonable for two reasons: i) a high tax rate can 
be compensated by better supply of public goods and ii) MNEs are able to reduce or avoid the tax 
burden in high tax rate countries using intra-firm transfer pricing and other financial tools (see 
Swenson, 2001, Clausing, 2003 and Huizinga and Laeven, 2005 for related empirical studies), 
therefore, they may be not sensitive to the negative effect of the tax rate. 
Finally, in Model 6 we replace the agglomeration variables of foreign and domestic firms with a 
single variable for the total number of foreign and domestic firms. The coefficient of this variable 
is significantly positive. 
22 Given that a number of explanatory variables have missing values for 
some NUTS2 regions, for Model 4, 5 and 6, seventeen regions are dropped from the choice set 
and consequently, 1,272 firms out of 1,342 firms remain in the sample for 229 NUTS2 regions.
23      
The coefficients of the country or region-level determinants can be converted into the average 
probability elasticities (APEs) using the method discussed in Section 3.2. That means that the 
coefficients of these variables can be roughly read as elasticities. For instance, the coefficients of 
market potential across the six specifications range from 0.2 to 0.5,  meaning that for a one per 
cent increase in market potential in an average region, the probability of this region being chosen 
by MNEs will increase by 0.2 to 0.5 per cent. Other variables in log form can also be interpreted 
in this way. While in terms of those variables in percentage forms, their APEs are evaluated at the 
                                                 
22 We also estimate the same set of models with non-spatially-lagged agglomeration variables as a robustness check. 
Similar results are found. These results are available from authors upon request. 
23 These dropped regions are located in Denmark (three regions, that is to say, all Danish regions), Germany (four 
regions), the UK (two regions), Slovenia (two regions, that is to say, all Slovenia regions) and Bulgaria (six regions, 
that is to say all Bulgaria regions).    15
mean value of each variable. For instance, in the cases of tertiary education attainment, if the 
share of workers with tertiary education of a region increases by one per cent, the probability of 
this region being chosen would increase by 0.8 to 1 per cent. Similarly, one per cent increase in 
the statutory tax rate will lead to 0.3 to 0.5 per cent increase in the location probability. On the 
other hand, one per cent increase in the unemployment rate will reduce the probability of location 
by 0.5 to 0.6 per cent.  
The Location of ICT Service Sectors: Conditional Logit Models 
Table 2 reports the results of location choices in the ICT service sectors. Model 1 is a baseline 
model, where market potential and the agglomeration of foreign and domestic firms have 
significantly positive effects, while GDP per capita has a significantly negative effect.  
In Models 2 and 3, education attainment is positively correlated with the probability of a region 
being chosen, while the unemployment rate reduces the location probability. In the last three 
columns, the number of internet users shows a significantly negative effect on the location choice 
(Model 4). The statutory tax rate has conflicting effects in Models 5 and 6. The agglomeration of 
total firms shows a positive effect. For the same reason of missing values, 7,271 out of 7,602 
firms remain in the sample and they locate in 229 NUTS2 regions. 
Again, the coefficients of market potential, GDP per capita and agglomeration variables can be 
directly read as APEs. The APE of education attainment is ranging from 2 to 2.5 per cent and that 
of the unemployment rate from minus 0.3 to minus 0.7 per cent. 
Models 4 – 6 (Table 1) for ICT manufacturing sectors and Models 5 and 6 (Table 2) for ICT 
service sectors will be used to estimate the NLM in the next step.
  
Estimates of Nested Logit Models  
In order to estimate the NLM, regions need to be partitioned into different nests. Disdier and 
Mayer (2004) use an East Europe – West Europe nesting structure. In Basile et al. (2003) and 
Basile et al. (2007) European regions are grouped into several nests, such as Anglo (UK and 
Ireland), Iberic (Spain and Portugal), core and periphery, North or South Europe and even in 
individual countries. Mataloni (2007) uses a natural country - region nesting structure. Based on 
these studies, we explore several nesting structures. For instance, the EU15-EU10 nest takes into 
account the difference of the EU member states in institutions and economic development, as   16
well as the geographic feature. The UK and Ireland are grouped into the same nest due to a 
common language, which may make these two countries particularly attractive to US MNEs. 




26, and a broadly-defined North Europe nest
27. Finally the natural partition of countries is 
applied. 
The decision of which nesting structure qualifies is based on two criteria: first the IV parameters 
need to be in the 0-1 range and second, a model with smaller Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC)
28 is preferred. Due to space constraints, the IV parameters and the BICs for various nesting 
structures are not reported
29. To estimate NLM models, based on overall results, we decide to 
apply the following structures for ICT manufacturing: UK/Ireland – rest of regions and North-
South-East; for the ICT service sectors we select the following structures: North-South-East; 
EU15-EU10.  
The Location Choice of ICT Manufacturing Sectors: Nested Logit Models  
Table 3 reports the results of the NLM for the full sample in three models and two nesting 
structures. Looking at the first nesting structure (UK-Ireland - the rest of regions), the three 
alternative models yield consistent estimates for region and country - level determinants of the 
location choice. MNEs are more likely to locate their new investments in regions with a larger 
market potential, with more firms from the same sectors, better labour quality, higher R&D level, 
higher tax rate, lower labour costs and lower unemployment rate. The results are also consistent 
with those obtained with the CLM shown in Table 1. However, the NLM estimates are much 
smaller than the CLM estimates, suggesting that if not accounting for the correlation between 
alternatives, the CLM results might be biased upward. We also test the validity of IIA using a 
likelihood-ratio (LR) test that all τ s of a model are jointly equal to unity. Chi-square statistics of 
the LR test are reported at the bottom of Table 3. For the three models, the H0 of IIA is rejected at 
the 1 per cent level. Moreover, the IV parameters for the three models are all smaller than 1. In 
                                                 
24 Finland, Sweden. 
25 Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece. 
26 The EU10 countries excluding Bulgaria. 
27 UK/Ireland, Nordic and West European countries. 
28  2ln ln( ) BIC L k n =− + , where L  is the log-likelihood of a model, k  is the number of variables and n  is the 
number of observations. BIC rewards large likelihood but penalises the loss of degree of freedom due to more 
variables in the model. See Schwarz (1978) for discussion. 
29 The results are available upon request from the authors   17
the last three columns, the second nesting structure (North-South-East) leads to consistent 
estimates with those from the first nesting structure (UK-Ireland – the rest of regions), however 
the magnitude of the coefficients are much larger in the second nesting structure (North-South-
East). Considering that the IV parameters in this latter nesting structure are closer to unity, the 
coefficients should converge to those of the CLM. 
The coefficients of the NLM can also be converted into APE by multiplying the coefficients by a 
parameter (see Section 3.2). The range of APEs for all variables with statistically significant 
coefficients are summarised as follows for the two nest structures and three models. An increase 
in market potential by one per cent for an average region leads to an increase in the probability of 
this region being choosing by MNEs by 0.2 to 0.6 per cent. An increase in GDP per capita by one 
per cent leads to a decrease in the location probability by 0.6 to 1 per cent. An increase in the 
agglomeration variable of foreign-owned firms by one per cent leads to an increase in the 
location probability by 0.2 to 0.3 per cent. An increase in the agglomeration variable of domestic-
owned firms by one per cent leads to an increase in the probability by 0.2 to 0.4 per cent. An 
increase in the agglomeration variable of total firms by one per cent leads to an increase in the 
location probability by 0.3 to 0.5 per cent. An increase in tertiary education attainment by one per 
cent leads to an increase in the location probability by 0.8 to 0.9 per cent. An increase in the 
unemployment rate by one per cent leads to a decrease in the location probability by 0.2 to 0.6 
per cent. An increase in R&D expenditure by one per cent leads to an increase in the location 
probability by 0.1 to 0.2 per cent. An increase in the number of patent applications by one per 
cent leads to an increase in the location probability by 0.1 to 0.2 per cent. An increase in the 
statutory tax rate by one per cent leads to an increase in the location probability by 0.3 to 0.9 per 
cent.  
Firm heterogeneity effects: US MNEs versus EU MNEs 
Motivated by Basile et al. (2003) and Hogenbirk and Narula (2004)
 30, we also explore the 
possibility of firm-level heterogeneous behavior in location choice, which might occur due to the 
country of origin of MNEs. The location choice model is estimated separately for US MNEs and 
                                                 
30 Basile et al. (2003) find that, when investing in EU countries, US MNEs treat regions within a country as 
equivalent substitutes, whereas the location decision of EU MNEs respond to regional differences. Hogenbirk and 
Narula (2004) find that US and Japanese MNEs prefer the Randstad region in the Netherlands, while EU MNEs 
prefer the regions which border other EU countries.   18
EU MNEs using the same model specifications. The results are reported in Table 4. Only the first 
nest of regions is used for US MNEs because no other nesting structure can generate the IV 
parameters within the 0 - 1 range. 
Looking at the first six columns the main differences between the two types of MNEs are 
reflected on the following variables. Market potential has a significantly positive impact on EU 
MNEs, but no impact on US MNEs. In terms of labour market conditions, US MNEs are not 
affected by labour costs, while EU MNEs are. On the other hand, the effects of labour quality and 
the unemployment rate are the same for both US MNEs and EU MNEs: positive or none. In 
terms of agglomeration, both types of agglomeration have larger impacts on EU MNEs’ location 
choices than on US MNEs’. Moreover, foreign firms have a much weaker effect on US MNEs’ 
location choice than domestic firms do which is also true for EU MNEs. The finding shows that 
both US MNEs and EU MNEs benefit from agglomeration with foreign or domestic firms, but 
EU MNEs benefit more. If one thinks about a French-owned firm and a US-owned firm both 
located in Germany, the former is more likely to interact with domestic firms than the later 
because its French parent perhaps is more familiar with the German business environment or has 
a long history of doing business in Germany. By the same logic, the French-owned firm is also 
more likely to interact with other foreign firms in Germany because most of the foreign firms are 
from other European countries. Turning to R&D development, there is rather weak evidence 
suggesting that US MNEs are attracted by regional R&D development because the coefficient is 
only significant at the 10 per cent level. In contrast, a positive influence of R&D development on 
EU MNEs is evident. This suggests that US MNEs rely more on their own in-house R&D 
activities and therefore do not count on spillover effects from local R&D activities to the same 
degree. Finally, the statutory tax rate appears to impact positively on the location choice of US 
MNEs, but it has no effect on EU MNEs. 
Location Choices in the EU15 and EU10 Regions  
There is one concern related to the pooling of location choices made in the EU15 and EU10 
countries. Significant differences might exit between the EU15 and EU10 countries in terms of 
country and region-level characteristics (as described in Tables A2a and A2b) and institutional 
structure. Therefore, when MNEs are considering the location of new investments, they may treat 
initially the EU15 and EU10 as separate alternatives. Once they decide in which broad area to   19
invest, they then look at each country or region within the chosen area. Disdier and Mayer (2004) 
found that French MNEs did treat the EU15 and Central and Eastern Europe as distinct 
alternatives and consequently they respond to country-level determinants of the two groups of 
countries in different ways. On the basis of this consideration, we decide to separate the location 
choices made in the EU15 and EU10 in order to explore any difference that may exist in the two 
areas. 
Table 5 reports the results for location choices made in the EU15 and EU10 countries. Two 
nesting structures (Nest 1: Anglo-North
31-South
32 and Nest 2: Anglo-West
33-Periphery
34) apply 
to the EU15 area, and one nesting structure (Nest 3: country-region) applies to the EU10 area
35. 
The choices of these nesting structures are based on the IV parameters and BIC as well.
36 
Comparing these results with the results for the location choices made in the EU15 and EU10 
areas, two major differences emerge.  First, market potential has a highly significant and positive 
impact on MNEs in the EU15 area. This is consistent with the findings for the full sample. 
However, it shows a marginal negative impact on MNEs in the EU10 area. This finding suggests 
that MNEs’ location choices of manufacturing facilities in the EU10 are not driven by local 
demand. We believe that this is caused by the fact that such facilities constitute a part of MNEs’ 
global production network and are involved in the lower end in the vertical production chain, that 
is to say, assembly and packaging. Second, GDP per capita always has a highly significant and 
positive effect for the location choice made in the EU15 regions, with education attainment, the 
unemployment rate and the R&D level controlled for. We think this finding reflects the 
correlation of GDP per capita and the high-tech nature of the ICT manufacturing sectors in the 
EU15. The multiple controls of skill and R&D are not sufficient to absorb the positive effect 
from labour costs, though they themselves have expected effects (except R&D expenditures). On 
the other hand, when making location decisions in the EU10 area, MNEs are not affected by GDP 
per capita, only marginally attracted by education attainment but positively affected by the 
                                                 
31 The nest includes Sweden, Finland, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Luxembourg. 
32 The nest includes Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece. 
33 The nest includes Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Luxembourg. 
34 The nest includes Sweden, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece. 
35 Although the IV parameters of the country-region nesting structures does not comply with the requirement of the 
RUM framework, this structure is the only one amongst all candidate structures we tried that produces significant 
Chi2. Therefore, we see the results of this nesting structure are indicative.  
36 To save space we do not report the IV parameters and BIC of all candidate nesting structures explored. The results 
are available upon request.   20
unemployment rate and R&D expenditure. These findings suggest that in the EU15 area, MNEs 
are mainly looking for high quality labour in order to match their technical level in production, 
but in the EU10 area, MNEs are mainly attracted by larger labour-force pool, instead of labour 
skill level. 
Further, in the EU15 area, MNEs are more likely to choose countries with a higher statutory tax 
rate, but in the EU10 area, MNEs are not affected by the tax rate. Economists take different views 
regarding the positive effect of the corporate tax rate.  For instance, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2000) 
argues that a higher tax rate is associated with better provision of public goods. Baldwin and 
Krugman (2004) provide a theoretical explanation that with the existence of agglomeration 
benefits, states can apply a high tax rate while still retain a high level of investments. Therefore, 
it is possible for MNEs to choose those countries with high tax rates. Another explanation lies in 
the variation of the tax rates across countries in the two areas. In the EU15, the tax rates are 
ranging from 11 per cent (Ireland) to 45.4 per cent (Germany), while in the EU10 they range 
from 18 per cent in Hungary to 35.7 per cent in Slovakia. The two extreme cases in the EU15 
possibly make the identification of the tax effect much easier. 
One additional point needs attention is that for the country-region nesting structure, the τ s for 
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia are unity because there is only one NUTS2 region in each of these 
countries, hence regional correlation does not exist and such nest is called “degenerated”. 
The Location of ICT Multinationals in the Service Sectors: Nested Logit Estimates 
Table 6 reports the results for the full sample with two alternative models and two alternative 
nesting structures. Looking at the IV parameters first, Models 5 with two nesting structures are 
all consistent with the RUM framework. Models 6 are all not consistent with this framework. 
Hence our discussion focuses on the Models 5 only. The results from the NLM indicate a picture 
of how MNEs reacted to various region and country-level determinants that is consistent with the 
picture that is produced by the CLM in Table 2. MNEs are attracted by better market access, 
agglomeration, labour quality, but they are less likely to choose regions with high labour costs 
and high unemployment rate. However, the effects of internet users and the statutory tax rate are 
ambiguous, which prevents us from drawing a definite conclusion for these two variables.   21
The APEs of the variables for Model 5 are as follows (except for internet users and the tax rate): 
an increase in market potential by one per cent for an average region leads to an increase in the 
probability of this region being choosing by MNEs by 0.5 to 0.8 per cent. An increase in GDP 
per capita by one per cent leads to a decrease in the location probability by 0.8 to 1.2 per cent. An 
increase in the agglomeration variable of foreign-owned firms by one per cent leads to an 
increase in the location probability by 0.4 to 0.5 per cent. An increase in the agglomeration 
variable of domestic-owned firms by one per cent leads to an increase in the location probability 
by 0.1 per cent. An increase in the agglomeration variable of total firms by one per cent leads to 
an increase in the location probability by 0.3 to 0.4 per cent. An increase in tertiary education 
attainment by one per cent leads to an increase in the location probability by 2 to 2.4 per cent. An 
increase in the unemployment rate by one per cent leads to a decrease in the location probability 
by 0.2 to 0.8 per cent.  
In addition to the identified determinants, the EU15-EU10 nesting structure is proved to be 
appropriate for the study of the ICT service sectors’ location behaviours. A similar pattern is also 
confirmed in Disdier and Mayer (2004). They find that the institutional differences are the major 
cause of the “East-West divide”. 
37  
US MNEs versus EU MNEs 
Differences with respect to US and EU MNEs are shown in Table 7. The IV parameters suggest 
that for US MNEs, only Model 5 of nesting structure 2 may provide indicative estimates, which 
are comparable with those of EU MNEs. The major differences of two types of MNEs are that 
US MNEs are not sensitive to labour costs, while EU MNEs are negatively affected by this factor. 
The effect of labour quality is approximately three times higher for US MNEs than for EU MNEs. 
Agglomeration of foreign firms has a much greater influence on US MNEs than on EU MNEs 
and agglomeration of domestic firms has no effect on US MNEs. However, the effects of the two 
types of agglomeration on EU MNEs are all significant. The number of internet users has rather 
ambiguous effects on US MNEs but it certainly affects EU MNEs negatively. Finally the tax rate 
has a negative effect on US MNEs but positive effect on EU MNEs. 
                                                 
37 In some preliminary estimations, we find that the similar variables measuring institutional variations across 
countries show unexpected negative effect. Therefore, we decide not to include such variables.     22
It would be interesting to compare the location choices of US and EU MNEs in the ICT 
manufacturing sectors. In those sectors, the positive impact of foreign firms is much stronger on 
both US and EU MNEs, while in the service sectors, we have exactly reversed effects. However, 
the heterogeneous pattern with respect to labour costs is consistent for the two sectors: US MNEs 
are not sensitive to it but EU MNEs do react to it negatively.  
Location Choice in the EU15 and EU10 Regions  
Table 8 shows that both the location choices made in the EU15 and EU10 areas are positively 
influenced by market potential, the agglomeration of foreign firms and education attainment. 
However, the negative effect of domestic firms in the EU15 area is rather unusual, which 
confirms our assumption that competition in the market of less tradable ICT services may deter 
foreign firms from entering local markets and such a competition effect arises primarily from 
domestic firms. Domestic firms appear to attract MNEs in the EU10 area. The observed negative 
effect of agglomeration in the case of EU15 regions contrasts to most of other empirical studies 
(except Hogenbirk and Narula, 2004, where they find competition effect from domestic business 
presence
38). Disdier and Mayer (2004) find a weaker agglomeration effect in CEECs than in the 
EU15 and interpret the finding as being driven by strong competition effect in the CEECs 
(equivalent to the EU10).  
The effects of GDP per capita and the unemployment rate are different in the EU15 and EU10 
areas respectively. It can be seen that in the EU15 area, MNEs are using labour cost as the signal 
of labour quality and they are looking for regions with more flexible labour market, while MNEs 
in the EU10 area are interested in regions with low labour cost and a larger labour pool. Recall 
the similar location pattern is observed for the ICT manufacturing sectors in two areas separately 
(Table 5). 
Turning to the policy variables, MNEs are more likely to locate in the EU15 regions with a 
higher statutory tax rate, but less likely to do so in the EU10 regions. The effect of internet users 
is ambiguous in the EU15 area, while it is consistently positive in the EU10 area. 
                                                 
38 When comparing the Randstad region (the agglomerated region containing large cities, major ports and airports) 
with the rest of the Netherlands, the presence of local business seems to work as a deterrent for new foreign 
establishments.   23
6   Summary and Concluding Remarks 
We briefly summarise the major findings and highlight some differences in the location choice of 
MNEs in the ICT producing and service sectors and in  the EU15 and EU10 regions: 
First, when we look at location choices made in the European Union (EU25), it appears that 
regions with a high level of market potential attract more multinationals in ICT manufacturing 
and services. When we separate the EU15 and EU10, we find that, in the case of the ICT 
manufacturing sectors, this effect is driven by location  choices taken place in the EU15, but not 
in the EU10.  
Second, with respect to labour markets conditions, while in the EU15, MNEs appear attracted by 
more flexible labour markets and high-skill labour , in EU10, MNEs were attracted by the 
advantage of low labour costs and a larger labour pool. This result suggests that underlying 
technological contents of new investments made EU15 and EU10 might be different. 
Third, in the ICT service sectors there is a negative agglomeration effect coming from the 
presence of domestic firms in the EU15, but not in the EU10. The effect of domestic firms in the 
manufacturing sectors is never negative, no matter which geographic area we examine. One 
potential explanation is that competition might be stronger in the service sectors. 
Fourth, a high statutory tax rate is generally associated with a higher probability of choosing a 
region in the manufacturing sectors, but it does discourage new investments in the service sectors 
in the EU15. 
Finally, in terms of firm-level heterogeneity, we find that US MNEs are not affected by labour 
costs, while EU MNEs are negatively affected by this factor.        24
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Table 1. Determinants of Location Choice (CLM, ICT Manufacturing Sectors, EU25) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Market potential  0.098  0.172*** 0.385*** 0.306*** 0.311***  0.474***
  (0.061) (0.059) (0.066) (0.072) (0.071) (0.069)     
GDP per capita  -0.138**  -0.365*** -0.633*** -0.649*** -0.682***  -0.900***
  (0.066) (0.068) (0.078) (0.080) (0.080) (0.075)     
Foreign firms     0.479*** 0.418*** 0.339*** 0.319*** 0.327***           
     (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.031)           
Domestic firms  0.368*** 0.347*** 0.300*** 0.210*** 0.199***           
     (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.035)  (0.036)           
Total  firms        0.327***
        (0.049)     
Education attainment    0.038*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.042***  0.048***
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)     
Unemployment rate      -0.057*** -0.054*** -0.049***  -0.064***
      (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)   
R&D expenditure        0.142***   0.229***
        (0.048)    (0.046)   
Patent applications          0.142***           
          (0.042)           
Statutory tax        0.015*** 0.013**  0.009*  
        (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)   
Pseudo  R2  0.085 0.093 0.097 0.098 0.097 0.093     
Number  of  observations  307508 291288 291288 291288 288517 291288 
            
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is located in region j and zero for all other 
regions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, ** 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, * statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. The 
coefficients can be read as the average probability elasticities.   29
 
Table 2. Determinants of Location Choice of ICT Service Sectors (EU25) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Market potential     0.399***  0.470***  0.553***  0.537***  0.514***  0.817*** 
  (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021)       
GDP per capita  - 0.335***  -0.774***  -0.893***  -0.828***  -0.853***  -1.216*** 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035)       
Foreign firms    0.577***  0.450***  0.410***  0.408***  0.437***              
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011)             
Domestic firms  0.250***  0.121***  0.100***  0.094***  0.074***             
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)             
Total  firms       0.363*** 
        (0.016)       
Education  attainment    0.094*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.103*** 0.119*** 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)    
Unemployment rate      -0.027***  -0.032***  -0.030***  -0.073*** 
      (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)    
Internet users        -0.131***  -0.054  -0.066    
        (0.047)  (0.049)  (0.042)    
Statutory  tax       0.019***  -0.008*** 
          (0.003)  (0.002)    
Pseudo  R2  0.162 0.193 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.175       
Number  of  observations  1741208 1665059 1665059 1665059 1665059 1665059     
 
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is located in region j and zero for all other 
regions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, ** 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, * statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. The 
coefficients can be read as the average probability elasticities.   30
 
Table 3. Determinants of Location Choice (NLM, the ICT Manufacturing Sectors, EU25) 
 Full  sample 
  Nest 1  Nest 2 
  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Market  potential  0.091*** 0.098*** 0.119*** 0.265*** 0.219*** 0.477*** 
  (0.029) (0.030) (0.036) (0.067) (0.066) (0.075) 
GDP per capita  -0.244***  -0.255***  -0.308***  -0.446***  -0.401***  -0.784*** 
  (0.044) (0.046) (0.058) (0.091) (0.085) (0.106) 
Foreign  firms  0.080***  0.089***  0.256***  0.247***  
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.035)  (0.032)  
Domestic  firms  0.158***  0.161***  0.170***  0.140***  
  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.034)  (0.033)  
Total  firms     0.228***    0.274*** 
     (0.031)    (0.058) 
Education  attainment  0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Unemployment  rate  -0.008* -0.008* -0.009*  -0.042***  -0.034***  -0.050*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
R&D  expenditure  0.056***  0.085***  0.097**   0.178*** 
  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.039)  (0.042) 
Patent application    0.044**      0.114***   
   (0.018)    (0.033)  
Statutory  tax  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.012***  0.008** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
IV  Parameters        
UK/Ireland  0.312*** 0.318*** 0.359***       
All rest countries  0.392***  0.399***  0.426***       
North      0.819***  0.767***  0.887*** 
South      0.587***  0.533***  0.630*** 
East      0.833***  0.783***  0.864*** 
Number of firms  1272  1272  1272  1272  1272  1272 
Number of regions  229  229  229  229  229  229 
Number of 
observations 291288  291288  291288  291288  291288  291288 
Log  likelihood  -6201.8  -6194.8 -6221 -6217.1  -6205.3  -6249.8 
Chi2 for H0: IIA  62.4***  56.8***  93.9***  31.9***  35.9***  36.1*** 
BIC 12529.5  12515.4  12555.2  12572.5  12548.9  12625.5 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is located in region j and zero for all other regions. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, ** statistically significant 
at the 5 per cent level, * statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. Chi2 is the statistics of the 
likelihood-ratio test of the hypothesis that IIA holds.   31
 
Table 4. Determinants of Location Choice (NLM, the Manufacturing Sectors, EU25) 
  US MNEs  EU MNEs 
  Nest 1  Nest 1  Nest 2 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6
Market potential  0.024  0.030  0.037  0.145** 0.167*** 0.185** 0.191**  0.160** 0.297***
  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.027) (0.061) (0.064) (0.076) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) 
GDP per capita  -0.023  -0.031  -0.035  -0.403***-0.424***-0.496***-0.410***-0.365***-0.579***
  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.033) (0.095) (0.099) (0.131) (0.105) (0.099) (0.107) 
Foreign firms  0.042**  0.048**    0.106*** 0.129***   0.152*** 0.160***  
  (0.020)  (0.022)    (0.033) (0.035)    (0.037) (0.034)   
Domestic firms  0.082***0.086***   0.163*** 0.166***   0.139*** 0.121***  
  (0.029)  (0.031)    (0.033) (0.035)    (0.040) (0.039)   
Total  firms      0.117***    0.233***    0.178***
      (0.043)    (0.048)     (0.054) 
Education attainment  0.007**  0.007**  0.007** 0.009** 0.010** 0.010** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014***
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Unemployment  rate -0.000  -0.000 0.000 -0.012 -0.011 -0.014  -0.024*** -0.018** -0.028***
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
R&D  expenditure 0.025   0.036*  0.130***  0.176*** 0.146***  0.191***
  (0.016)    (0.019) (0.043)  (0.055)  (0.047)  (0.048) 
Patent application    0.018      0.094**     0.132***  
    (0.016)     (0.037)    (0.040)  
Statutory  tax  0.004**  0.004**  0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
IV  Parameters             
UK/Ireland  0.140**  0.149**  0.149** 0.411*** 0.413*** 0.472***    
All rest countries  0.160***0.167***0.171***0.549*** 0.558*** 0.583***      
North           0.667***  0.620*** 0.674***
South           0.413***  0.378*** 0.393***
East           0.685***  0.651*** 0.664***
Number  of  firms 347  347  347 608 607 608 608 607 608 
Number  of  regions  229  229  229 229 229 229 229 227 229 
Number  of  observations  79463 78769 79463 139232 137789 139232 139232 137789 139232 
Log likelihood  -1583.7  -1584.4  -1591.2 -3007.9 -3002.6  -3016 -2997.36  -2987.8  -3007.347
Chi2 for H0: IIA  39.0***  36.6***  69.2*** 7.8**  6.8**  10.5*** 28.8***  36.5*** 27.9***
BIC  3280.3  3281.5  3283.9 6134.2 6123.6 6138.6  6125  6105.8  6133 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is located in region j and zero for all other regions. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, ** statistically significant 
at the 5 per cent level, * statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. Chi2 is the statistics of the 
likelihood-ratio test of the hypothesis that IIA holds.   32
 
Table 5. Determinants of Location Choice (NLM, the Manufacturing Sectors) 
 EU15  EU10 
  Nest 1  Nest 2  Nest 3 
  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Market  potential  0.300*** 0.251*** 0.316*** 0.393*** 0.371*** 0.400***  -1.073*  -0.050  -0.622     
  (0.085) (0.080) (0.082) (0.100) (0.095) (0.092)     (0.564)  (0.472)  (0.450)   
GDP per capita  0.563***  0.538***  0.576***  0.547***  0.522***  0.609***  1.151  0.075  0.481    
  (0.150) (0.142) (0.152) (0.180) (0.176) (0.199)     (0.751)  (0.629)  (0.607)   
Foreign firms  0.087**  0.080**    0.073*  0.068*             0.515**  0.441*           
  (0.037)  (0.034)    (0.041)  (0.039)             (0.201)  (0.228)           
Domestic  firms 0.228***  0.188***  0.266***  0.236***             0.260  0.641***           
  (0.061)  (0.055)    (0.079)  (0.074)             (0.181)  (0.221)           
Total firms      0.322***      0.378***    0.551*** 
     (0.077)      (0.102)         (0.201)   
Education attainment  0.020***  0.017***  0.019*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.015***  0.020  0.066  0.061*     
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)     (0.037)  (0.048)  (0.036)   
Unemployment rate  -0.033***  -0.024***  -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.027** -0.032*** 0.111**  0.058  0.110**   
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)     (0.043)  (0.038)  (0.047)   
R&D expenditure  0.061    0.066  0.060    0.063     0.602***    0.548*** 
  (0.041)    (0.041)  (0.046)    (0.048)     (0.213)    (0.211)   
Patent application    0.103***      0.090**               0.201           
    (0.037)      (0.042)               (0.696)           
Statutory tax  0.014***  0.012**  0.010**  0.009  0.007  0.005     -0.068  0.073  0.024    
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)     (0.072)  (0.070)  (0.049)   
IV Parameters                            
Anglo 0.870***  0.812***  0.859***                    
North 0.730***  0.692***  0.743***                    
South   0.590***  0.546***  0.602***                    
Anglo       0.982***  0.950***  0.989***       
West       0.807***  0.786***  0.849***       
Periphery       0.666***  0.636***  0.708***       
CZ                       1.282***  1.676***  1.434*** 
EE         1  1  1 
HU         1.055***  1.556***  1.166*** 
LT         1  1  1 
LV         1  1  1 
PL         1.538***  1.615***  1.461*** 
RO         2.126***  1.823***  1.965*** 
SK         0.025  0.021  0.037       
Number of firms  1047  1046  1047  1047  1046  1047  225  225  225 
Number of regions  183  181  183  183  181  183  46  46  46 
Number of observations  191601  189326  191601  191601  189326  191601  10350  10350  10350 
Log  likelihood  -4799.3 -4786.1 -4800.5 -4798.7 -4786.3 -4798.8   -725.2  -729.7  -730 
Chi2 for H0: IIA  48***  49.6***  63.4***  49.3***  49.2***  66.9***     23.2***  20.8***  25.9*** 
BIC  9732.4 9705.9 9722.7 9731.2 9706.3 9719.1 1579.9 1588.8 1570.9 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is located in region j and zero for all other regions. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, ** statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, * 
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. Chi2 is the statistics of the likelihood-ratio test of the hypothesis that IIA 
holds. The IV parameters for Estonia (EE), Lithonia (LT) and Latvia (LV) are the unity because there is only one region in 
each country and the within-nest correlation is set to be unity.     33
 
 
Table 6. Determinants of Location Choice (NLM, the ICT Service Sectors EU25) 
 Full  Sample 
  Nest 1  Nest 2 
  Model 5  Model 6  Model 5  Model 6 
Market  potential  0.325*** 1.672*** 0.472*** 1.283*** 
  (0.020) (0.331) (0.027) (0.092) 
GDP per capita  -0.487***  -2.251***  -0.760***  -1.946*** 
  (0.035) (0.389) (0.048) (0.151) 
Foreign  firms  0.299***  0.399***  
  (0.011)  (0.016)  
Domestic  firms  0.062***  0.071***  
  (0.007)  (0.011)  
Total  firms   0.720***  0.624*** 
   (0.142)  (0.050) 
Education  attainment  0.061*** 0.245*** 0.090*** 0.189*** 
  (0.003) (0.048) (0.005) (0.015) 
Unemployment  rate  -0.013*** -0.172*** -0.026*** -0.088*** 
  (0.003) (0.038) (0.004) (0.009) 
Internet users  0.022  -0.463***  -0.028  -0.670*** 
  (0.030) (0.172) (0.051) (0.109) 
Statutory  tax  0.014*** -0.039*** 0.017*** -0.028*** 
  (0.002) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) 
IV  Parameters      
EU15 0.655***  2.043***     
EU10 0.525***  2.684***     
North    0.915***  1.652*** 
South    0.834***  1.743*** 
East     0.881***  1.668*** 
Number of firms  7271  7271  7271  7271 
Number of regions  229  229  229  229 
Number of observations 1665059  1665059  1665059  1665059 
Log  likelihood -31781.1 -32565.9 -31824.9 -32472.4 
Chi2 for H0: IIA  98.3***  50.3***  10.8**  237.4*** 
BIC  63705.5 65260.7 63807.3  65088 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is located in region j and zero for all other regions. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *** statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, ** statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level, * statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. Chi2 is the statistics of the likelihood-ratio test of 
the hypothesis that IIA holds.  34
 
Table 7. Determinants of Location Choice (NLM, the ICT Service Sectors, EU25) 
  US MNEs  EU MNEs 
  Nest 2  Nest 1  Nest 2 
  Model 5  Model 6 Model 5  Model 6  Model 5  Model 6 
Market potential  0.554*** 19.553  0.229*** 0.773*** 0.303***  0.658***
 (0.088)  (35.240) (0.021)  (0.093)  (0.027)  (0.045) 
GDP per capita  0.269  1.394  -0.329*** -1.299*** -
0.479*** -1.038***
 (0.194)  (4.034)  (0.036)  (0.163)  (0.044)  (0.072) 
Foreign firms  0.606***   0.215***   0.264***   
 (0.069)    (0.012)    (0.014)   
Domestic firms  0.047    0.088***   0.107***   
 (0.029)    (0.009)    (0.012)   
Total firms    6.714    0.437***   0.392***
   (11.593)   (0.058)    (0.033) 
Education 
attainment  0.132*** 3.207 0.034*** 0.103*** 0.043***  0.076***
 (0.020)  (5.794)  (0.003)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
Unemployment rate -0.052*** -3.029  -0.008*** -0.069*** -
0.020*** -0.043***
 (0.016)  (5.655)  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Internet users  -0.232  -18.019  -0.049  -0.208** -0.073  -0.313***
 (0.174)  (32.334) (0.033)  (0.082)  (0.048)  (0.072) 
Statutory tax  -0.022*** -1.570  0.011*** 0.003  0.013***  0.002 
 (0.008)  (2.879)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
IV Parameters             
EU15     0.528*** 1.083***    
EU10     0.373*** 1.012***    
North 1.161*** 23.072      0.683***  0.954***
South 1.533*** 43.938      0.482***  0.720***
East 2.120*** 51.001      0.545***  0.793***
Number of firms  1845  1845  3722  3722  3722  3722 
Number of regions  229  229  229  229  229  229 
Number of 
observations  422505 422505 852338  852338 852338 852338 
Log likelihood  -7196.1  -7373  -17021.2  -17378.6 -17027.7  -17329 
Chi2 for H0: IIA  70.8***  237.7*** 94.7***  12.3***  81.6***  111.6***
BIC 14534.6  14758.
4  34178.9 34880.1 34205.
6  34794.5 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is located in region j and zero for all other 
regions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, ** 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, * statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.  
Chi2 is the statistics of the likelihood-ratio test of the hypothesis that IIA holds.  35
   
              
Table 8. Determinants of Location Choice (NLM, the ICT Service Sectors) 
 EU15  EU10 
  Nest 1  Nest 2  Nest 3 
  Model 5  Model 6  Model 5  Model 6  Model 5  Model 6 
Market  potential  0.395*** 0.612*** 0.436*** 0.555*** 0.229*** 0.456*** 
  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.030)    (0.065)  (0.119)   
GDP per capita  0.796***  0.727***  0.845***  0.935***  -0.759***  -1.045***
  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.055)  (0.065)    (0.108)  (0.177)   
Foreign firms  0.215***     0.120***            0.174***           
  (0.010)     (0.014)            (0.028)           
Domestic firms  -0.055***    -0.008            0.053**           
  (0.008)     (0.011)            (0.022)           
Total firms     0.077***     0.069***     0.306*** 
     (0.015)     (0.017)       (0.073)   
Education  attainment  0.029*** 0.047*** 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.079*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.006)  (0.012)   
Unemployment rate  -0.042*** -0.082*** -0.043*** -0.054*** 0.013***  0.008    
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.005)  (0.008)   
Internet users  0.076*  -0.307*** 0.027  -0.112*** 0.205**  0.314*** 
  (0.040)  (0.037)  (0.042)  (0.043)    (0.079)  (0.110)   
Statutory tax  -0.009*** -0.038*** -0.002  -0.005**  0.035***  0.107*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.011)  (0.025)   
IV Parameters                   
North  0.606***  0.679***                    
South  0.453***  0.492***                    
Anglo        0.687***  0.814***       
North        0.550***  0.583***       
South        0.469***  0.517***       
Central Europe              0.267***  0.401*** 
Baltic countries + RO              0.313***  0.464*** 
Number of firms  6281  6281  6281  6281  990  990   
Number of regions  183  183  183  183  46  46  
Number of observations  1149423  1149423  1149423  1149423  45540  45540   
Log likelihood  -25029.7  -25420  -25017.2  -25050.3  -2426.8  -2439.4  
Chi2 for H0: IIA  270***  119.7***  295.2***  859***    21.2***  7** 
BIC 50199  50965.6  50187.8  50240.2  4960.9  4975.3 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is located in region j and zero for all other 
regions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, ** 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, * statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.  
Chi2 is the statistics of the likelihood-ratio test of the hypothesis that IIA holds.  36
Appendix 1: Derivation of Average Probability Elasticity of the Nested Logit Model 
 
Rewrite the utility function of individual i choosing alternative  k hn ∈  be  hh h UX β ε ′ =+  
(subscript i is dropped to keep the formula concise). Let  h x  be one variable of interest 
and it enters  h X′ in its logarithm. The corresponding coefficient of ln h x  is  x β . Denote  h τ  
the inclusive value parameter for the nest where alternative h lies in. Rewrite and 
simplify Equation (4) by inserting Equation (3) into (4) where is applicable and denote 
exp( / ) exp( ) hh U τ = i  and exp[ ln exp( / )] exp( ) hh h J U ττ = ∑ ii , we have  
(A1)  
|
exp[ ln exp( / )] exp( / )
Pr Pr Pr
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 into Equation (A2), we have 
|| (1 Pr ) Pr (1 Pr )
h
x






=−+ − . 
The subscript h can be replaced with  j  to represent any alternative  , (1,..., ) k j nj J ∈ ∀= .  
To obtain the sum of 
j x e  over any alternative lL ∈ , we firstly sum up 
j x e  within 







































k n J  is the number of alternatives in nest  k n . Then sum up 
j k x Jne
∈ ∑  over nest 
kK ∈  to get  
.................
1



























Finally, the average probability elasticity for L alternatives w.r.t. x is 
1
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Appendix 2. Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables and Firm Data 
 
 
Table A1. Explanatory variables 
Variable Description  Source 
Region level    
Market 
potential 
GDP of a region and its adjacent regions, for which their 
GDP are inversely weighed by their distance to the first 
region. 
Cambridge 
Econometrics and own 
calculation 
GDP per capita  GDP per capita, in Euro.  Cambridge 
Econometrics 
Agglomeration 
of ICT sectors 
(domestic and 
foreign-owned) 
Number of ICT manufacturing firms (ICT service firms). 
Two narrow measures include foreign-owned firms with 
foreign owner has at least 10 per cent share or domestic 
firms. A broad measure includes both domestic and foreign-
owned firms. All three types of agglomeration variables are 





The proportion of workers in the labour force holding a 
tertiary degree or above.  Eurostat 
Unemployment 




Regional R&D expenditure of both business and government 
at 1995 USD (million).  Eurostat 
Patent 
applications 
Number of patent applications of ICT sectors to the European 
Patent Office.  Eurostat 
Country level    





rate  Statutory top corporate tax rate at country level.  World Tax Data Base 
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Mean 32,492.5  15,729.3  26.8  99.6 123.6  325.0  9.6  412.6 50.7 
Standard 
deviation  38,489.8  9,052.0  50.6  273.0 177.9 533.1  5.2  824.3 129.9 
Maximum 367,658.2  45,895.6  435  2,432  1,323  4,355  28.2  8,883.2 1,033.4 
Minimum  763.5  1,176.8  0 0 0 0  2.2  0.0  0.0 
EU15 
countries           
Mean 36,879.3  18,106.9  27.3 111.5  134.3  349.2 9.0  489.5 64.0 
Standard 
deviation  40,016.8  6,588.8  51.1  300.1 182.6 513.6  5.1  897.1 143.8 
Maximum 367,658.2  45,591.3  435  2,432  1,323  3,618  28.2  8,883.2 1,033.4 
Minimum  763.5  6,548.8  0 0 0 0  2.5  0.0  0.1 
Eu10 
countries           
Mean 6,923.6  3,811.6  26.0 56.7 86.1  240.5  12.1 85.8  1.5 
Standard 
deviation  4,566.4 5,620.1  49.7  121.2  156.2  607.1  5.4  137.1  2.7 
Maximum 22,152.0  42,610.0  312  779  1,077  4,355  25.2  709.6  15.0 
Minimum  2,947.0  1,176.8  0 0 1 3  2.2  0.9  0.0 
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Table A2b. Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
(country level) 
Full sample 
Internet users  
(per 100 inhabitants) 
Statutory tax rate 
(%) 
Mean  13.8 31.2 
Standard 
deviation  8.6 7.2 
Maximum  33.5 45.4 
Minimum  2.9 11.0 
EU15 countries    
Mean  18.2 33.0 
Standard 
deviation  8.3 7.7 
Maximum  33.5 45.4 
Minimum  5.7 11.0 
EU10 countries    
Mean  7.5 28.5 
Standard 
deviation  4.5 5.5 
Maximum  16 35.7 
Minimum  3.4 18.0 
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Table A3. Geographic Distribution of ICT Manufacturing Firms 
 (number of firms, by ownership and industry) 
Industry  NACE 30  NACE 32  NACE 33 
Ownership  Total  US EU Other Total  US EU Other Total  US EU Other 
AT  4  0 3  1  13  1 11  1  26  1 20  5 
BE  3  0 2  1  12  4 6  2  8  5 2  1 
BG  1  0 0  1  18  2 15  1  7  0 6  1 
CZ  4  0 2  2  9  0 6  3  9  2 7  0 
DK  4  1 2  1  11  0 10  1  16  0 9  7 
EE  0  0 0  0  10  1 9  0  2  0 1  1 
FI  0  0 0  0  2  1 1  0  9  1 5  3 
FR  5  1 2  2  44  18 14  12  52  20 21  11 
DE  45  10 25  10  127  26 53  48  210  56 84  70 
GR  0  0 0  0  3  0 3  0  2  1 1  0 
HU  1  0 1  0  10  2 6  2  2  0 2  0 
IE  11  6 4  1  5  2 2  1  23  9 12  2 
IT  11  2 8  1  20  5 13  2  31  12 16  3 
LV  1  0 1  0  0  0 0  0  1  0 0  1 
LT  0  0 0  0  1  0 1  0  0  0 0  0 
LU  0  0 0  0  0  0 0  0  1  1 0  0 
NL  8  1 3  4  16  3 7  6  27  10 8  9 
PL  16  2 14  0  12  0 9  3  33  6 23  4 
PT  2  0 2  0  2  0 1  1  7  1 3  3 
RO  24  4 12  8  32  2 23  7  57  0 46 11 
SK  0  0 0  0  1  0 1  0  0  0 0  0 
SI  0  0 0  0  0  0 0  0  1  0 1  0 
ES  7  2 4  1  8  0 6  2  7  2 3  2 
SE  2  0 2  0  8  4 2  2  7  1 5  1 
GB  45  18 16  11  84  35 24  25  162  72 55  35 
Total   194  47 103  44  448  106 223  119  700  200 330  170 
Notes: 30: manufacture of office machinery and computers. 32: manufacture of radio, television and 
communications equipment and apparatus. 33: manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments 
and clocks. Ownership: US -  owned by US MNE parent; EU - owned by EU parent; Other - owned by 
MNE parent from the rest of the world. 
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Table A4. Geographic Distribution of ICT Manufacturing Firms (share, by industry) 
Industry  % 30  % 32  % 33  % 30+32+33 
Ownership  Total Total Total  Total 
AT  2.1 2.9 3.7  2.9 
BE  1.5 2.7 1.1  1.8 
BG  0.5 4.0 1.0  1.8 
CZ  2.1 2.0 1.3  1.8 
DK  2.1 2.5 2.3  2.3 
EE  0.0 2.2 0.3  0.8 
FI  0.0 0.4 1.3  0.6 
FR  2.6 9.8 7.4  6.6 
DE  23.2 28.3 30.0  27.2 
GR  0.0 0.7 0.3  0.3 
HU  0.5 2.2 0.3  1.0 
IE  5.7 1.1 3.3  3.4 
IT  5.7 4.5 4.4  4.9 
LV  0.5 0.0 0.1  0.2 
LT  0.0 0.2 0.0  0.1 
LU  0.0 0.0 0.1  0.0 
NL  4.1 3.6 3.9  3.9 
PL  8.2 2.7 4.7  5.2 
PT  1.0 0.4 1.0  0.8 
RO 12.4  7.1  8.1  9.2 
SK  0.0 0.2 0.0  0.1 
SI  0.0 0.0 0.1  0.0 
ES  3.6 1.8 1.0  2.1 
SE  1.0 1.8 1.0  1.3 
GB  23.2 18.8 23.1  21.7 
Total    100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
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Table A5. Geographic Distribution of ICT Service Firms  
(number of firms, by ownership and industry) 
Industry  NACE 64  NACE 72 
Ownership  Total  US EU Other Total  US EU  Other 
AT  21  5 15  1  171  17 123 31 
BE  20  5 15  0  105  20 76  9 
BG  19  2 15  2  71  4 58 9 
CZ  16  2 14  0  61  7 49 5 
DK  39  6 20  13  160  33 95 32 
EE  6  0 4  2  30  3 20 7 
FI  7  2 5  0  45  7 31 7 
FR  44  13 21  10  287  90 166 31 
DE  192  27 108  57  1049  198 551 300 
GR  12  1 9  2  25  6 19 0 
HU  3  1 2  0  7  2 5 0 
IE  42  10 26  6  190  76 96 18 
IT  26  6 14  6  112  31 68 13 
LV  2  0 2  0  0  0 0 0 
LT  3  0 3  0  8  1 4 3 
LU  2  0 2  0  29  1 16 12 
NL  42  10 26  6  173  46 84 43 
PL  26  2 21  3  80  13 64  3 
PT  8  2 6  0  41  5 32 4 
RO  154  31 79  44  593  90 420 83 
SK  1  1 0  0  0  0 0 0 
SI  0  0 0  0  1  1 0 0 
ES  66  18 41  7  219  38 151 30 
SE  13  4 3  6  108  21 44 43 
GB  447  134 160  153  2826  906 1148 772 
Total   1211  282 611  318  6391  1616 3320 1455 
Notes: 64: post and telecommunications; 72: computer and related activities. Ownership: US - owned by 
US MNE parent; EU - owned by EU parent; Other - owned MNE parent from the rest of the world. 
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Table A6. Geographic Distribution of ICT Service Firms (share, by industry) 
Industry  % 64  % 72  % 64+72 
Ownership Total  Total  Total 
AT 1.7  2.7 2.2 
BE 1.7  1.6  1.6 
BG 1.6  1.1 1.3 
CZ 1.3  1.0  1.1 
DK 3.2  2.5 2.9 
EE 0.5  0.5  0.5 
FI 0.6  0.7  0.6 
FR 3.6  4.5  4.1 
DE 15.9  16.4  16.1 
GR 1.0  0.4 0.7 
HU 0.2  0.1 0.2 
IE 3.5  3.0  3.2 
IT 2.1  1.8  1.9 
LV 0.2  0.0 0.1 
LT 0.2  0.1  0.2 
LU 0.2  0.5 0.3 
NL 3.5  2.7 3.1 
PL 2.1  1.3  1.7 
PT 0.7  0.6  0.7 
RO 12.7  9.3 11.0 
SK 0.1  0.0  0.0 
SI 0.0  0.0  0.0 
ES 5.5  3.4  4.4 
SE 1.1  1.7  1.4 
GB 36.9  44.2  40.6 
Total   100.0  100.00  100.0 
 
 
 
 